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Questions to ask 1) Is it relevant under 401? a. What is the relevance theory 2) Does categorical exclusion apply? 3) Is testimony hearsay (i.e., statement offered for truth of matter asserted)? a. If so, does it fit w/in 1 of the exceptions b. Don’t forget the garbage pail exception 4) Is evidence more prejudicial than probative under 403? 5) Should the judge issue a limiting instruction under Rule 105? a. can get if only admissible for one purpose but probably ineffective
Remember: judge determines preliminary questions under 104(a)
Models of Decisionmaking § rational truthseeking – construe evidence to promote rational DMing § quasi-rational truthseeking – jurors not completely rationale so judges should restrict some info. to counteract cognitive biases § narrative integrity – evidence must fit into norms (normal narrative) o Does X make intuitive sense? o concern about legitimacy of courts § fingerprints and eyewitnesses part of our system o what does jury reasonably expect to see? § pragmatic DM’ing – should construe rules of evidence based on exigencies of case o no general point
Is information relevant (401/402)? § What is relevance theory? (i.e., for what purposes is evidence being introduced?) o is it for proper purpose under categorical exclusion/char rules? § only “relevant evidence” can be admitted - 402 o “relevant evidence” is evidence that makes a fact (that is “of consequence to determination of the action”) more or less probable than w/o evidence - 401 § rule combines relevance w/ old notion of materiality § liberal standard – doesn’t say how much more probable · a brick is not a wall – difference b/w relevance and sufficiency § presupposes and construct norms of how world works § 104 – preliminary ?s o (a) ?s of admissibility determined by court (i.e., judge) o (b) – relevancy conditioned on fact – court should admit upon evidence sufficient to support fulfillment of condition § NOTE: all evidence is conditionally relevant to some extent but only that which doesn’t connect to factfinders’ experience comes under 405 § might reflect policy determination (e.g., gay in sexual assault case; Solom – woman didn’t want child split in half) § Probabilistic proof o Bayes Theorem – determines conditional probability – new evidence changes initial likelihood ratio (of guilt, witness credibility, etc.) § Does evidence make something more probable than not? o People v. Collins (Cal. 1968) (evidence of mathematical probability irrelevant b/c illogical and distracted jury from key issue) o Commonwealth v. Beausoleil (Mass 1968) – inculpatory paternity test results admissible w/ limits b/c inform on probability of paternity o ? of legitimacy – whether sufficient to take away liberty § Smith v. Rapid Transit (Mass. 1945) – color of bus not enough to find D liable § So need non-probabilistic proof to substantiate § needs to be related to offense (e.g., mens rea irrelevant if strict liability) § might have to meet preliminary foundation (104(b)) o But if applied 104(b) literally would never admit anything b/c everything is relational § what is marginal relevance once you stipulate? o quasi rational truthseeker will say no weight o but narrative integrity model disagrees (See State v. Crump – allowed to present gruesome photos despite stipulation to murder) o Old Chief – legitimate contribution of evocative evidence can’t always be reproduced by dry stipulations
Is information more prejudicial than probative (403)? § 403 – exclude relevant evidence if probative value is “substantially outweighed” by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading jury, or delay o favors admissibility b/c only outlawed where “substantially outweighed” § General rule – should admit if it makes things better and exclude if it makes things worse § Judges have broad discretion o reversed on appeal only for “clear abuse” of discretion o explicitly invites judges to evaluate cognitive, emotional and other sensibilities that underwrite factfinders’ inferences § in assessing probative value, think of marginal value o SO don’t think in absolute terms, but relative to alternatives or remaining proof (Old Chief) § examples of excluded evidence o unfair prejudice – § sensational evidence (e.g., D’s criminal background) · gruesomeness of photos not grounds for inadmissibility (State v. Crimp (Kan. 1982)) o reasoning follows narrative integrity model – need of prosecutors to tell story § concealment of identity (US v. Silverman (9th Cir. 1988)) – not sufficient to infer guilt · NOTE: didn’t say exclusion as prejudicial but this speaks to motivational prejudice – guilty of something so who cares what · Compare Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) – unprovoked flight is sufficient grounds for Terry stop o SO seems to be relevant § DK’s 3 kinds of prejudice · motivational prejudice (provokes animus to D) · inferential o concern of quasi-rational truthseeker humans will misprocess info. (vividness; descriptive richness) · political – connection b/w evidence and norms o e.g., passion for retribution o confusing or misleading (failure to prosecute others) § SO relevant but processed inappropriately (seven smelly t-shirts) o needlessly cumulative o collateral (e.g., impeach witness on color of coat) § not in rules explicitly; common law req § e.g., State v. Stone (NC 1954) – prejudicial to admit evidence D had condoms in incest trial; 7 months after insistent) · clearly relevant – Bayes theorem – but prejudicial b/c jury might have animus § can’t be just evidence that hurts case; has to derail jury’s thinking § balancing includes centrality of point to be proved, need for evidence, availability of alt. sources and likelihood jury would understand limiting instruction under FRE 105 § problem is jurors might give evidence more weight than it deserves (See Lempert, Modeling Relevance) Is information barred by a categorical exclusion rule (404/407/411)? § If not, can still exclude if prejudice outweighs probative value (404) § extension of logic of 403 – where prejudice outweighs probative value o DK thinks 403 does all the work – polices boundary lines o how judge applies Rule 403 reflects his/her stance on potentially contested and evolving social norms § to get excluded ŕ argue policy § position law takes feeds back into norms o only thing that prevents parties from evading rules (e.g., impeachment) is judge’s commitment to underlying policy § 407 – subsequent remedial measures not admissible to prove fault (e.g., negligence; product defects) but admissible for other purposes (e.g., ownership, control) o idea is that remedial action is equally consistent w/ mere accident and negligence o counters “hindsight bias” – people overstate probability of past events § BUT Posner says reminder is enough to counter o social policy of encouraging safety measures but decreases ex ante rationale for safety measures o stipulations endorsed as grounds for excluding evidence on issue of feasibility o doesn’t apply to 3rd party measures (e.g., govt. recall) (sounds like it should from text but nothing to do w/ policy rationale) o only applies to measures after event § SO if make changes after manufacture but before event, still admissible o obviously relevant, but prejudicial - really problem is overvaluation o Rhode Island has exact opposite rule – evidence admissible § BUT just have to remove to fed court (fed proc rules apply – See Hanna v. Plumer) § SO no incentive for states to have different rule b/c will remove to federal court o admissible purposes § impeachment of witness who claims no safer product design feasible · this possibility seems to swallow rule b/c either admit to feasibility of change or get impeached · BUT maybe feasibility different than utility (freak accident) o But then fact of repair further relevant § can get limiting instruction under Rule 105 § BUT always balance against risks of prejudice and confusion · See Petree v. Victor Fluid Power (3d Cir. 1989) – can’t use impeachment as subterfuge for getting in negligence o in Petree refusal to allow evidence of warning decal to be used for impeachment was error § 408 – settlement offers and negotiations o evidence not admissible (as admission of liability) unless offered for another purpose (e.g., bias or prejudice of witness, negating contention of undue delay, proving effort to obstruct criminal investigation or prosecution o advisory notes list 2 bases for exclusion § (1) irrelevant b/c motivated by desire for peace § (2) public policy favoring settlement – prejudice o statements of fact during negotiations also excluded though admissible at common law § BUT can admit evidence otherwise discoverable (e.g., accident record) or for another purpose? o unclear whether spontaneous apologies excluded § determining whether something is settlement depends on judges’ view of underlying policy § proposed CT and HI bills would exclude – rationale is to prevent lawsuits and speed settlements o only applies where liability contested (so if only payment uncertain, admissible) § SO – prelim question – is liability contested? o BIG EXCEPTION TO 408 – impeachment – can’t present evidence to establish liability but can use evidence to contradict D (e.g., in settlement said he ran the light and now says it was green) § 409 – furnishing, offering or promising to pay medical, hospital or similar expenses not admissible to prove liability o only fact of payment, not related admissions of fact (e.g., I was drunk) are excluded § 410 – w/drawn pleas, pleas of nolo contendre, plea discussions not admissible against D unless a) statement “ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously” w/ another statement made in course of discussions; (b) criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement o just applies to statements of accused but may also be able to exclude statements of prosecutors under 408 o Ds can waive o criminal trial guilty plea not conclusive like jury verdict re: collateral estoppel
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